A Rushed Critique of Hobbes

In this rather shorter post I would like to offer some critical reflections on Thomas Hobbes, and his “Leviathan” (1651) in particular. Of course, I do not claim to be comprehensive in my arguments, and I recognize that they might indeed be open to critique themselves. Nonetheless, I would like to engage with several of Hobbes’ key proposition. Those, acquainted with the work, can safely skip the next two paragraphs.

For those, unacquainted with the work, “Leviathan” is an extensive piece of writing of political philosophy, heavily influenced by the Scientific Revolution (especially in its attempts to provide a “theory” following a scientific method, which resembles slightly International Relations’ “Second Greate Debate” from the 1950s between positivists and behavioralists ), individualism, but mostly the English Civil War and the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. It introduces key ideas, such as that of a social contract, state of nature, and others, which are still fundamental to political theory today. In short, it argues that in the absence of all authority, a.k.a. state of nature, men is in a perpetual situation of conflict, “where every man is Enemy to every man”, and consequently “the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”. Therefore, the only way to escape this fate is for each to accept individually the rationality of giving away our Right of Nature (basically, the Right to do everything without any constraints) to the “artificial person of the state”, embodied by an absolute Sovereign, whose powers are without limits.

First of all, I must admit the powerful Cartesian logic, driving the whole argument (revealingly, Hobbes had significant correspondence with his contemporary, Rene Descartes). It may well be that it is a simple, at first glance even straightforward claim, but the way it is structured is fascinating even today. Hobbes’ first Book is called “Of Men” and revealingly deals with human nature, using Appetites and Aversions to build up his argument of human nature. After having established that, he then examines human behavior in a hypothetical situation – a state of nature, where there is no overriding authority, no Leviathan (a.k.a. no state), and shows it to be uncooperative, non-trusting, aggressive. It is important to note that he does not see this as a result of the wickedness of human beings, but simply a logical consequence from their rational individualistic behavior in this state of nature. Hobbes then argues that human beings rationally understand the need for a social contract, the need to give up their rights for the creation of some kind of authority – a state, embodied by a Sovereign (one or a multitude of people). According to him, the state of nature is a worst-case scenario, so everything is better. Therefore, to secure the power of this artificial authority, he argues, we need an absolute sovereign with extensive, monolithic powers, which is not subject to popular control, and has some other attributes. Thus, he logically conclude, absolute monarchy is the best form of government to prevent us from sliding into a state of nature and perpetual war.

However logical this account is, I have some problems with it. First, its assumption that people behave rationally may not be accurate, but that is a highly debatable subject. My main objections, though, are the following:
1. The physiological/psychological thesis of human nature, offered by Hobbes does not allow for free choice and free will, because people are just machines.
- Appetites and Aversions presuppose the acceptance of the object as a reference point
- It does not allow for change in people’s perceptions, people’s thinking
2. How does Hobbes account for the rationality of human beings?
3. If individual people recognise that it is rational to have one single sovereign, why do we have different states?
4. The basic premise is that of a competition for limited resources, a scarcity of resources, which arguably we are no longer facing.
5. The claim that equality between human beings leads to conflict is no longer accurate.
6. Related to the previous objections, it uses a concept of power, which is no longer relevant today.

I would still like, however, to look into the idea that people are behaving rationally. Of course, here I am developing a critique, which itself depends on many unwritten assumptions, one of which is the human ability of rational and logical thought. In terms of behaviour, however, people are not always behaving rationally. This is due, to a certain extent, to the simple fact that we take into considerations many factors at once, and it is hard to determine what is the most rational way of behavior, if there is such, and even if we were able to do this, it may not lead to our desired outcome (consider, for example, someone who wants to make an impression on some people by performing a stunt – he runs the risk of getting injured, which is hardly rational). In particular, however, I would like to challenge Hobbes’ key assumption – that by using Reason, humans come to the conclusion that it is more rational to give up their Natural Right of Liberty and come together in a absolutist Commonwealth. There is a whole separate branch of psychology, dealing with behaviour of large masses of people, which is quite interesting by itself, but could hardly be called rational all the time. Nonetheless, following Hobbes’ methods, I would like to consider the following event as a manifestation of a particular “state of Nature” – traffic jams.

If you think about it, traffic jams as a closed system could well be considered a “state of Nature”. It is true, that unlike Hobbes’ vision of a state of Nature, traffic does involve some general restrictions and rules, designed to protect our own physical safety – road signs, traffic lights, etc., and there is even an overall Leviathan-like authority – police. However, all these are not of much significance in a traffic jam. Here, the worst outcome would then not be violent that, and “the life of man” is obviously not “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. For the purposes of the argument we can then say that the worst-case scenario is significant delay in the amount of time it takes to reach your destination, possibly leading to other problems. The Right of Nature in traffic jams is that everybody is permitted to take every road he/she wants and to drive his/her own car. There, though, exist other options – to walk, to cycle, or to use the public transport system (to cooperate). Individually, the best option is, of course, to have the road for yourself – just you, your car, and a free highway. Thus, you will get in the fastest possible way to wherever you want to go. For those of you, who have used the Bulgarian public transport, the worst option would be to be stuck in a traffic jam and to not even be in your own proper car. There is quite a range of intermediate options – a couple of people driving with the same car, the aforementioned walking and cycling, actually comfortable buses, but the general point is that the best case scenario requires the exercise of your Natural Right and the non-exercise of the others’ Natural Right, but as the Right of Nature could not be morally and justly restricted without a Commonwealth, nothing can prevent everyone from using their Right of Nature – to drive alone in their car. This, naturally, leads to traffic jams (even when some people willingly “lay down” their Right by taking public transport or walking/cycling). I would like to just note that this game theory approach to traffic jams could of course be inherently wrong, if we reject the postulates of Cartesian logic. Here, however, according to Hobbes, we should all realise that it would be more secure (in terms of a set amount of time, more or less, which would take to get to a certain place, rather than risk being seriously late) to renounce the use of our cars (additionally, this would be beneficial for the environment, but that’s a whole different line of reasoning), and to all just take the public transport. This would also require that we give the police the right to arrest everyone who is driving a car, as to prevent the breaking up of this “social contract” (when somebody starts to drive his car, he is starting to exercise his Right of Nature again, and therefore it would then be moral and just for everyone else to also exercise their Right, i.e. to get their cars). Nonetheless, this does not happen – people still drive their cars, even though Reason can demonstrate the advantages of laying down the Right of Nature. Notice that this would not be in the name of the common good, or in the name of saving the planet, but simply in the rational self-interest of every participant in the traffic. This could demonstrate two main things. First, humans may be actually not that susceptible to rational argument when acting in large groups, and Hobbes’ theory deals with fundamental questions, involving a significant number of people. Consequently, some non-rational considerations may be more important than the pure rational analysis of humans, which Hobbes offers. Second, this raises the question whether it is really rational to agree to drastic limitations in your personal freedoms in order to guarantee better security for everyone. This is, admittedly, classical 21st C reasoning, based on “freedom” as a virtue in itself. The values and preoccupation of Hobbes, and probably of his contemporaries, were mostly that of peace and security, but this would then lead to the conclusion that Hobbesian absolutist thought is no longer of any relevance in the kind of society we live in. In any case, the big question mark of whether people prefer freedom or security remains (although the events of 1989, and much of Western European thought, arguably suggest an answer, which is dominant in a number of areas, notably in the concept of “human rights”). Nonetheless, it may also be that I am making generalizations from a particular case, but for Hobbes to claim that he has uncovered scientific “laws” about human behaviour (it may well be that this in itself is an impossible task as each human being is unique – another classical liberal and 21st C notion), he needs to account for all cases.

To carry on from here, I will point to some particular logical arguments, which are not fully convincing, but most importantly I would argue that Hobbes’ account holds no particular value for the contemporary world, but is rather simply an interesting intellectual exercise for academic purposes. Admittedly, Hobbes’ argument is remarkably cohesive, logical, and thorough, otherwise it would have long found itself in the “dustbin of history”, and he was really a remarkable thinker for his own time, who gave impetus to a number of other key authors to develop their own ideas, which we can now see in the world around us (notably Locke and Rousseau, and liberalism as a whole, arguably today’s meta-narrative in the Western world). However, from today’s perspective, we can relatively easily discard Hobbes’ account for the simple reason that “Leviathan” is unable to explain the process of change, the result of which we see today, and is therefore inapplicable in the contemporary situation. Nevertheless, I want to reiterate the importance of four centuries of hindsight that we enjoy today.

Coming back to my first criticism, the mechanistic view of human nature, presented by Hobbes, does not allow for independent judgment and thus for what’s generally called free will. Here, Hobbes is quite obviously influenced by the Scientific Revolution of his time. He tries to bring down the individual down to a cluster of atoms with Appetites and Aversions, which provoke motion. First of all, where do Appetites and Aversions come from, if human beings are just “motion of limbs” and automata? This implies that there is some innate knowledge inside our “atoms”, which provokes them to behave in the way they do. Hobbes would probably argue that this is the instinct for self-preservation, and he will be right – we are probably not going to “move towards” a fire and risk serious injuries (what about firefighters – what motivates them, which is higher than the highest Hobbesian law, that of self-preservation? A probable answer would be that they are part of a society, and have given their Right of Nature, so they are forced by the authority of the Leviathan to carry out this job. This could indeed be seen as a final confirmation of the fact that we have renounced our rights completely – but if so, does this mean that suicides are justified? More importantly, however, what would motivate someone to enter a burning house to rescue a child? Is the “appetite” towards the child stronger than the “aversion” against fire? Hobbes would argue that the “endeavour” which won was to save the child. This, however, leaves the question, why would we save a child? This question remains valid even after the establishment of the social covenant, as it is highly unlikely that any authority would explicitly demand that). Nonetheless, what would motivate our actions when they are not particularly related to self-preservation – such as “appetites” for cars and clothes, and generally objects with only social significance? In a very roundabout way, one can argue that one has a self-preservation interest to increase power, and therefore the signs of it (i.e. Rolex, Mercedes, etc.), in order to be able to better defend himself against aggression. This raises yet another problem – if this is so, therefore we are using the creations of the social contract in a way, suitable to the State of Nature – so what is the point of the Social Contract if relations between people, excluding the Sovereign, remain as those between wolves (whether wolves live in a perfect state of nature is quite an interesting question, which I regret that I don’t have the opportunity to pursue here)? To come back to the original point, and to simultaneously go to my second criticism, Appetites and Aversions presuppose certain knowledge about what is good and what is bad, as well as a knowledge of the objects to which they pertain. How is it obtained in a State of Nature? The general answer we would give today is through socialization, but no such thing exists in the State of Nature. This relates to yet another of my criticisms – by taking people as they are, Hobbes has arrived at a conception of human beings, which is static and unchanging. He looks at them at one particular moment, without considering their development. Thus, he does not allow for change in ideas. For him, rationality is driving human beings forward, but rationality changes – what was rational in the 17th C isn’t necessarily rational now. Besides, when dealing with social relations, one has to take into account that, to reformulate Wendt, “social relations are what people make of them”, i.e. when dealing with other people one presupposes their possible reactions (whether this is a involuntary form of manipulation is quite an interesting question as well). To wrap up, Hobbes takes human beings as a sum of their parts and nothing more, which eliminates free will and does not account for either change or primary accumulation of knowledge (furthermore, paternal ties in a State of Nature have no meaning, because there isn’t any morality).

As already mentioned, Hobbes’ argument is driven by a belief in human rationality. The question of whether human are rational was discussed earlier (although one can argue that game theory aims to explain exactly how individual rational behavior turns into collective irrational behavior, although this still leaves the question of how then a high number of people would come together to form a social covenant). If we accept for the purpose of the argument that they are, then that leaves us with the question of where does rationality come from. Self-preservation is the obvious source, with all the associated “Vitall” functions. Is rationality only about self-preservation? And how does it arise out of simple movements “to” and “from” objects? Most importantly, how do people resolve dilemmas, where there is a lose-lose situation involved? What happens if a impetus for something is equally strong as impetus against something? This question could, of course, be dismissed just as a highly hypothetical suggestion. The concept of rationality also brings about another question – if security is indeed the preoccupation of all people, why are there different states? Surely, the most rational thing would be to come under one single Sovereign Leviathan, instead of having a number of states. To this, I can see two possible answers. First, some would argue that we are actually moving towards exactly such a form of world government (although even if we are, it is quite different from the Hobbesian Leviathan). Second, perhaps more convincingly, people would argue that it’s a matter of practical arrangement – one sovereign can only control so many people. This provokes further problems – why then the international system itself is not structured by several layers of Leviathans (however absurd it may sound to have several layers of absolute authorities)? Second, what would then cause war – if people have found equilibrium of practical absolute authorities, why would they seek to take over another state? I’ll now leave the discussion of the implications of Hobbesian theory for International Relations, as it is quite a broad subject.

Now, let me reiterate my three criticisms on why Hobbes, even if accurate in the 17th C, is no longer accurate today:
4. The basic premise is that of a competition for limited resources, a scarcity of resources, which arguably we are no longer facing.
5. The claim that equality between human beings leads to conflict is no longer accurate.
6. Related to the previous objections, it uses a concept of power, which is no longer relevant today.
I recognize, however, that my premises are highly controversial. Is there enough resources for everybody? Is raw physical power inaccurate today? For that reason, I will discuss this only briefly. First, conflict in the State of Nature arises when two people desire something, of which there is only one copy. If two people desire each one apple, and there are two apples, there’s no conflict – the conflict arises when there is only one apple. Arguably, in the world today there are enough apples, i.e. food, the basic requirement for self-preservation, as to feed adequately all. If this is true, and everyone has equal access to it, then I do not see a reason why there would be conflict in a State of Nature. Second, equality is generally not regarded as a source of conflict, but as a requirement for peace. That is due to a general change of perception, a somewhat Lockean recognition of each other’s right to be equal (which may of course be only a consequence of the social covenant). Third, the concept of power, used by Hobbes – raw, physical power, is not adequate today simply because there are other sources of power, as, for example, ‘soft power’, ideational power, etc (I will not discuss the idea of power any further, because it necessitates much more time and effort and is worthy of a separate discussion. Also, Hobbes also recognizes other types of powers, but considers raw physical power to be predominant in a State of Nature, which makes his claim particularly hard to argue against).

In conclusion, I would like to mention that throughout this post I have encountered numerous times the problem of separating a state of nature from society. The State of Nature is an abstract, hypothetical, philosophical construction of immense complexity, although its essence is quite simple (as with most important ideas). Even if this post suggests that I am not particularly fond of Hobbes, and, more importantly, that I don’t believe that he has anything of particular importance to offer to us today, I would still like to point out once more that we have the advantage of a three centuries of hindsight. Nonetheless, the sheer logical structure of his account is worthy of respect. I recognize that I have mixed empirical and theoretical criticism of Hobbes in quite a few places, but due to time constraints, I cannot go further in my critique for now. We must also not forget that he was the first to articulate such complex ideas, which were later taken up by Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and quite a lot of other key figures. Thus, the true value of Hobbes is in the foundations he set for all other political philosophers to build on, in which we can compare him in importance only to Socrates.

Advertisement