“TONIGHT AT THE MAGIC THEATER. FOR MADMEN ONLY. PRICE OF ADMITTANCE YOUR MIND. NOT FOR EVERYBODY. HERMINE IS IN HELL.” - Steppenwolf, Hermann Hesse
Dear reader,
It’s been a while, and I have finally transferred to another blog at A Man Dreaming . The logic of the other blog is slightly different – it’s a bit more eccentric and a bit more varied with less careful analysis and mostly shared thoughts. I will try to post in here every once in a while as well. Finally, you can find me on Twitter – @happysisyphus. Perhaps this is the place to wish you a belated Merry Christmas and a still a bit early Happy New Year! 
Думата “power” е сложна за превеждане на български език – в зависимост от контекста тя може да е “сила”, “власт”, “възможност”. Навремето Мао беше казал, че “властта/силата идва от дулото на пистолета”. Интересно е преплитането на власт и сила – властта не е само сила, трябва и легитимност за постигането на авторитет. В областта на политическите науки (не че ми е ясно защо се смятат за наука) има множество аргументи по въпроса кое какво точно означава, които обаче в реалния живот се свеждат до това кой може да упражнява сила легитимно и по принцип отговорът в демократичните общества е “служителите на Министерството на вътрешните работи”(1).
За да слезем обаче от “висините” на кулата от слонова кост на социологията и политологията, предлагам един практически казус: четирима цивилни полицаи нахлуват в дома ви в полунощ и нанасят множество телесни повреди на четирите члена на вашето семейство и на ваш гост от съседна страна. По първоначални данни – по погрешка, защото адресът бил сбъркан. Доколкото се знае, служителите са се идентифицирали пред един от членовете на семейството, който разбира се (за демократична държава) ги е пуснал да влезнат. Сега е моментът да се отбележат три неща – 1. полицаите са цивилни; 2. часът е около полунощ ; 3. в последните месеци има зачестили случаи на фалшиво представящи се за полицаи престъпници, като част от тях са с фатален завършек. С оглед на тези обстоятелства, когато полицаите, цитирам, “влизат по малко по-бърз начин” и в резултат на което се появява пукнат череп и множество синини, какво биха си помислили хората в дома, особено ако са и от малцинство в страната?
Съобщението за това се появява чак три дни по-късно (както се казва, “екшънът се е разиграл” в петък вечерта, а новината се появява в понеделник следобед). На следващия ден следват парламентарни престрелки – все пак служителите на реда са подчинени на МВР. Разбира се, във всяко демократично общество използването на сила е предмет на много дебати, но правната рамка и човешките права би трябвало да са в основата на всяко действие. Нека добавим към този практически казус още няколко елемента – 1. гореспоменатото МВР води изключително активна дейност в последната една година (макар и не особено активна дейност в събирането на доказателства) и изисква създаването на специализирани съдилища (т.е. изпълнителната власт иска да има политическо влияние в правосъдната система); 2. подобни ‘грешки’ не са прецедент ; 3. служителите на това МВР разполагат с “пълна оперативна свобода”. Понеже все пак става дума и за държавни институции, да допълним и политическата картина – 1. действията на МВР са един от най-големите стожери на управляващата партия; 2. министърът, начело на това МВР, се оглежда за възможност да излезе от сянката на лидера на политическата партия и се очаква да бъде кандидат на президентските избори; 3. един от пострадалите е лидер на младежки клон на политически партия с голямо влияние в региона, която е демонизирана от управляващото мнозинство.
Какво става после? Премиерът заявява, че го е срам и че иска наказания за превишилите правомощията си полицаи – една напълно адекватна реакция. И все пак, до преди изслушването на министъра на вътрешните работи отново се подчертава, че става въпрос за сбъркан адрес. На изслушването обаче изведнъж се оказва, че ставало въпрос за правилния адрес и се съобщава за замесени проститутки. Според министърът се оказва, че лидерът на местната политическа сила си е поръчал проститутки, които са дошли на адреса явно без това да забележат майката, бащата, дъщерята, или госта – става въпрос за “сигнал за поръчани момичета”. Или пък не? Същият този освен, че си ги е поръчал е и “посредничел между сводника и проститутките”, докато майката “не е знаела за заниманията на сина й”. Добре, нека приемем че местният политически лидер на младежкото звено на малцинствена партия е не само сътрудник на сводник, но и си поръчва собствените проститутки, чието присъствие остава незабелязано за неговата фамилия (според разработката на полицията, защото иначе трудно може да се прецени защо бащата, бивш полицейски служител, “не оказва съпротива” и пуска цивилните органи на “реда” да влезнат безпрепятствено). Същите тези органи на реда тогава реагират на място на първия женски силует и “влизат по малко по-бърз начин”, разбирай, удрят с все сила вратата в главата на дъщерята (а после е имало и предложения нейното медицинско да се прикрие срещу подкуп). Това е историята на този практически казус, една “рутинна” според думите на министъра процедура.
Забележително заплетен казус, нали? Особено когато и не е ясно дали е имало прокурорска заповед за влизане, има ли доклад за операцията (и ако има, включено ли е “използването на сила” в него), в това жилище ли в крайна сметка е трябвало да се проникне, има ли предложен подкуп. Каквито и да са отговорите обаче това няма да помогне нито черепът на момичето да зарасне, нито да се изтрие психологическия шок…нито, надявам се, да се отслаби натиска за прозрачност в работата на изначално проблеми институции като МВР. Съвременното демократично общество се гради на правната норма, на внимателно регулиране на отношението власт – (физическа сила) и не на последно място именно на прозрачност.
В България много биха казали, че обстановката е особен случай, който изисква особени мерки и именно затова трябва да се подкрепят действията на полицията, дори когато са малко “по-сериозни”, разбирай брутални. Нека обаче не отъждествяваме клиповете по телевизията с “воля за борба с престъпността”. Да, безнаказаността на прехода – и в областта на физическите престъпления, и в областта на измамите, и в политическите кръгове в ляво, дясно, център, горе и долу, е несправедлива и ужасна – дотолкова, че хората се прехласнаха по “мутрите” (клуб НЛО добре го пее – “Ех, как искам да бъда охранителен бос / със висяща присъда и със скрит сплескан нос / Да ме пазят петима на незнаен адрес / а в гаража да има чисто нов мерцедес.”). Да, безнаказаността води до повече престъпност поради липса на страх от “държавата”. Това обаче поражда два въпроса. Първо, с какво това ще се промени ако продължи добре познатата сапунка “ние ги хващаме, те ги пускат” (като съвсем отделен проблем е и да се гарантира, че това няма да се използва като политически инструмент, както и че няма да се насочва политически срещу ‘избрани’ престъпници)? Погледнато морално-етично, можем ли да приемем да осъждаме на “килограм”, ако дори и един от 10, от 100 души, е всъщност невинен? И можем ли да приемем като общество принципа “виновен до доказване на противното”? Второ, това ли е нашата представа за държава – едно МВР, което раздава ритници наляво и надясно и един парламент, който служи за обмен на обиди между политически “сили” със силно компрометирани (престъпления или некомпетентност или и двете) фигури? Дали все пак държавата не трябва да се ‘вижда’ и другаде освен по униформата на служителите на МВР и по печатите на НАП, като например в образованието, здравеопазването и заетостта?
В момента в България се получава леко парадоксална за праволинейното мислене картина – повече ‘полиция’, но повече престъпления и по-малко от тях разкрити. Като начало, можем да си зададем въпроса дали използването на МВР и като ПР агенция от страна на управляващите всъщност не е контрапродуктивно на техните декларирани цели – силната медиатизация, търсена и поощрявана от правителството с цел да си подкрепи рейтингите, тъй като полицията е един от малкото на брой ‘успехи’ (т.е. политики, които носят гласове и подкрепа) дава твърде голяма почва за изява и на задържаните заподозрени, които могат да мобилизират медиите и на своя страна. Още повече, след една година на подобни акции те вече не са нещо ново и желано (все още се сещаме за имената на първите 2-3 акции, обаче вече загубихме бройката и имената на последните – защото вниманието на избирателите изисква все повече и повече, за да бъде спечелено, то не може да се задържи от един и същи спектакъл, колкото и е да интересен), а могат лесно да се мобилизират от страна на защитата. Накрая все пак един реторичен въпрос – как успяват повечето западни страни да се справят с не по-малко престъпност (включително с терористични заплахи) без клипове на МВР и погрешно бити граждани?
Социалната сфера не е физически закон с отделни, независими една от друга сфери с ясно дефинирани причинно-следствени връзки. Горепосоченото увеличение на престъпленията е свързано с цялостната политика на правителството, но също така и с по-големи глобализационни (финансовата и икономическата криза) и структурни (20 години без визия и цел, а само лутане от избори до избори) фактори. Когато си докаран до отчайващо състояние изборът ти е изключително стеснен – само се поставете в положението на уволнените наскоро от ДАНС, които са тесни специалисти с високо развити, но малко на брой и специфични умения, за които вече няма легално приложение (подобен сценарии беше в основата на генезиса на следсоциалистическата престъпност). Ето защо използването на власт (част от която е директната ‘власт’ на силовото министерство, но също така и ‘властовите ресурси’ на всички други министерства) трябва да се поставя в цялостния структурен контекст и да се отчитат възможните взаимодействия – другото е само гонене на рейтинг. Силно препоръчвам анализа на Анатоний Тодоров за вижданията за сила/власт на това правителство, подчертано и от житейския път и психологическата настройка на ръководните фигури. За това правителство рейтингите и събирането на “власт”, политиката на “днешните новини” и въобще краткосрочните успехи са издигнати в култ и цел само по себе си. В същото време, България е изправена пред сериозни предизвикателства, които ще се усетят след края на това управление, но са ясно очертани – изключително неравномерно развитие на регионите в страната, което ни обрича на проблематичен и бавен ръст в национален мащаб (свързано и с проблемите на раждаемостта, както и цялостното застаряване на населението); засилена ‘сенчеста’ емиграция (подпомогната и от свободното движение в ЕС), този път не просто на хора, които търсят работа в чужбина, а от страна на най-компетентните и обещаващи кадри, които са извадени от България на възраст между 16-18 години – достатъчно рано, за да се адаптират бързо и безболезнено към една чужда по принцип среда; и разпадането на образованието, което трябва да осигури бъдещето на държавата чрез една напредничава икономика на знанието, и културата, която е социалното “лепило” за едно общество, или по-общо казано ерозията на социалния капитал на Путнам. Тези три кризи са свързани и взаимно засилващи се, предшестват финансовата криза и ще останат след нея, и са изключително сложни за решаване. Именно тук трябва да дойде държавата, при това видимо, а това и ще подпомогне работата на полицията. Но да се използва полицията, за да се лекуват симптомите на тези проблеми е скъпо, неефикасно и даже опасно, а има и меко казано неприятни последици като гореспоменатия практически казус. Затова и МВР не трябва да се защитава при всякакви условия, а да бъде разгледано в контекста на голямата социална система, която наричаме България – но докато то е в основата на рейтинга, това не би могло да стане. За обикновения човек обаче остава дилемата дали следващия път да отвори вратата си на “нашата полиция която ни пази” или … всъщност има ли “или” срещу силата, идващата от дулото на пистолет?
(1) Един много интересен псевдо-политфилософски въпрос е могат ли хората да живеят без сила/власт/принуда. За момента почти няма някакъв сериозен и успешен експеримент изключае някои експерименти на ранните утопични социалисти от 18-ти и началото на 19-ти век като Фурие – но пък според анархистите може и трябва (дали пък тук не виждаме леко изтъняла границата с крайния либертанианизъм?).
What is so special about reading? A book, according to a dictionary, is just “a set of written, printed, or blank pages fastened along one side and encased between protective covers”. A sequence of chapters, themselves a sequence of paragraphs, themselves a sequence of sentences, themselves a sequence of words, all this formed by 30 or so letters (at least in the case of most European alphabets). So how come books have become the leading ‘depository’ of human knowledge?
However, what we understand by books only appeared with the onset of industrialised modernity. In the 15th century, Gutenberg produced the first “modern bestseller” in ‘paperback’ – the Bible, but truly massive scale (although incomparable to the 200 000 books per year published in Europe – roughly a book every 2.5 minutes) was attained only with the invention of a steam-powered printing press. Thus, during the preceding centuries, books have been full of insights, but they remained particular physical objects – to own a couple of books was thus a sign of elitism, of status, the wisdom of which was available only to a select few. A useful parallel can be drawn here with visual arts – paintings all too often used to be more physical expressions of status and wealth first and foremost, and only then works of art (mainly reduced conceptually to aesthetics). However the age of mechanical reproduction initiated by the Industrial Revolution posed a serious question about the uniqueness of each painting or sculpture (see John Berger – Ways of Seeing), but this problem was not present to the books. Books, as the dictionary definition suggests, are composed of words – and words are not unique in themselves, nor are they by themselves a work of art (with the notable exception of calligraphy). Therefore, the ‘modernization’ of books easily shifted the emphasis from their uniqueness in terms of quantity to the uniqueness of books in terms of quality, or content. Two caveats are in order here. First, a book remains a physical object, even if of less exclusive quality, and therefore an object for acquisition in itself – even the act of buying James Joyce’s “Ulysses” for example brings purely consumerist satisfaction (and again denotes status – if you are buying “Ulysses” you are effectively declaring yourself as part of an elite with enough time and intellectual energy to spare in order to probe ‘deep’ questions, with enough leisure time, education, and resources – it is not a particularly cheap book – to spare). The effect of these market relations is twofold (and easily observed in other capitalist phenomena) – on the one hand, publishers and editors perform the role of ‘filters’ and may refuse to publish, that is, to bring into existence a book based on a manuscript – in which case the manuscript remains only a private achievement for the author and not a work, which speaks to an audience; on the other hand, market mechanisms naturally stimulate the production of purely entertainment literature, which consequently floods the market and leaves no choice to the reader/consumer but to look for guidance from professionals, be it literary critics or booksellers. The second caveat is that ancient books, or books from different cultures, whose words are mechanically reproduced today, require extra attention from the reader. Often, they might well have some timeless lesson to offer – but in order to ‘uncover’ this lesson, the reader needs extensive background knowledge. For example, it is particularly easy to read Machiavelli’s “The Prince” today as a cynic, unethical, and perhaps ironically outdated piece of writing belonging to ‘another time’. If the reader, however, is willing to reread the work, engage with it, and make an effort to understand (for complete knowledge is of course impossible) the epoch and the culture, which gave birth to the work, they may well find some ‘lessons’. In short, therefore, the books remains a modern physical commodity.
Despite these physical properties, which form the ‘spine’ of the book, most people would say it is the words which really count. What I am interested here is not so much what makes a great book great (people who know may have heard me declare that great books are almost always short, but I do recognise that length is hardly a proper way to judge a book), but rather what is the alchemy ‘reading’. Here, again, we need to first recognize the physical properties of reading. The act of reading requires two (and as I refer to private reading, no more than two) ‘participants’ – a book and a person. The act itself is a complex cognitive process, which involves overwhelmingly the eye, but also marginally touch and maybe smell. What is particularly fascinating about the process is how the Cartesian subject (the “I” of the reader) is essentially assuming the role of a receptor (although any serious reader should also ‘engage’ with what he or she is reading, but this is a post-factum process where the mind processes the ideas received by the book). Thus, essentially every time the “I” picks a book it recognizes the limited nature of its knowledge about the world and is therefore ready to learn more.
The alchemy of the process of reading is rooted in the process of decoding and ‘reconstructing’ the ‘message’ of the book. Essentially, it can be conceptualized by a two stage process, involving in both cases the brain. In the first part, through the medium of the eyes, we ‘decode’ the meaning of a particular sequence of symbols – a word or a sentence. Here it is important to remember one of Magritte’s most famous paintings:
Indeed, the painting is not a pipe, just as the word “chair” is not a chair, but the concept of chair. Some words can only exist as concepts, such as abstract nouns (love, confidence) or adjectives (beautiful, serious) (the universal recognition of such qualities is perhaps a good basis for the construction of a basic common humanity). This, of course, brings us to Saussure in particular, as well as Derrida and Barthes, and the question of the signifier and the signified. Words in a text are, in essence, signifiers – they only physically exist as dots of ink, but they conjure concepts in our minds. This is indeed the second stage of the process – the conjuring of the signified from our brain. Arguably, this is an even more complex cognitive process, where people dip into their knowledge structures, regardless of how we describe them as schemas, operational codes, etc. What books and reading does, then, is to add to our empirical knowledge or to prompt us to look upon our existing information in a new light. Thus, the decoding of the signifier on the page and the reconstruction of the signified in the mind, based on previous knowledge, is the ‘alchemy’, which forms the basis of reading.
Finally, this whole process requires enormous concentration and, depending on the book (and consequently the challenges it poses to our preexisting knowledge), varying degrees of intellectual energy and involvement. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that in the ever-faster moving postmodern world, with its ‘pointillist time’ to quote Zygmunt Bauman, with its entertainment simulacra culture (to borrow from Baudrillard), reading is mostly a neglected activity. In a world, where the biggest resource is time (“Time is money”), a book is a significant ‘investment’ with uncertain result, even if we assume that we have the intellectual interest and purchasing power to afford books. The ‘best’ books are those, who question and unsettle in order to help you see the world in a different way, and therefore cannot be ‘bestsellers’ in the entertainment-oriented market culture, much like the artistic and challenging films cannot equal the ‘box office successes’ of Hollywood movies.
A book is also a journey – it takes you from the first to the last page, whatever its narrative structure or plot, and just like with journeys, it is not the destination which is important, but the process. Thus, the pages of a book represent a promise – a promise to organise the world and to help you understand your place in it. In that sense, books give wings.
Shadow Play
To W.S.
Welcome to Plato’s cave,
Where no shadows dance.
I see Icarus’ already here.
See them all? See?
Forms. No shadows,
Just kings with crowns.
Price of admittance –
Your mind. Not for
Everybody. Proceed.
That? That’s just Munch.
They were never wrong,
The Old Masters, about
The beauty of urns.
Mistah Kurtz’s here again,
There with the hollow men.
Where thou art you,
Faust? “In the shadows
Of the Valley of death.”
Аз съм убиец.
Ето.
Признах си.
Убивам за удоволствие,
Знание,
Че и за пари дори.
Ето, вчера беше
Особено
Жестоко
Убийство.
С помощта на един австриец,
Името му бе Моцарт.
Двамата, заедно с
Обичайния заподозрян –
Мерло.
Не могат да ни хванат –
Няма
Следи.
Погледни.
Чисто е,
Нали?
Сигурно се чудите, сега,
„Ами аз какво да направя?”
Показания –
не са необходими,
Благодаря.
Имате моите самопризнания.
Години наред убивам,
Убивам.
Няма съвест и
Разкаяние.
Наричайте ме Каин.
Но аз брат нямам,
И никога не мога да имам.
Самопризнание.
Последен дух взимам.
Само минутка.
Хвърлям това бреме.
Аз съм убиец.
Убиец на време.
Аз съм убиец.
Ето.
Признах си.
Убивам за удоволствие,
Знание,
Че и за пари дори.
Ето, вчера беше
Особено
Жестоко
Убийство.
С помощта на един австриец,
Името му бе Моцарт.
Двамата, заедно с
Обичайния заподозрян –
Мерло.
Не могат да ни хванат –
Няма
Следи.
Погледни.
Чисто е,
Нали?
Сигурно се чудите, сега,
„Ами аз какво да направя?”
Показания –
не са необходими,
Благодаря.
Имате моите самопризнания.
Години наред убивам,
Убивам.
Няма съвест и
Разкаяние.
Наричайте ме Каин.
Но аз брат нямам,
И никога не мога да имам.
Самопризнание.
Последен дух взимам.
Само минутка.
Хвърлям това бреме.
Аз съм убиец.
Убиец на време.
It’s been a while since I’ve tried to get my head around Postmodernism as such. How do you define something which rejects definitions? How do you define the so-called “post-modern” attitude or condition, when its essence is in deconstructing, in a sense “destroying”, reality, and is characterized by a certain state, which seems to be “perpetual criticism” or even destructive “nihilism”? Well, Jean-Paul Lyotard comes close with his classical “incredulity towards metanarratives”. But if it is skeptical of metanarratives, than what is this broad movement/attitude/condition, if not a metanarrative itself? In a sense, I believe, postmodernism is a synthesis of liberalism and Marxism.
Prior to any further inquiry, it must be noted that these two “isms” are labels, and as such are nothing but a simplification and reductions of rich intellectual traditions. Of course, they themselves have developed in certain circumstances in a certain way and have been influenced by previous ideas (in terms of history, this poses the question of historical knowledge, and how far we need to go to explain causes and effects, if we accept that linkage at all of course). My intention here is not to give comprehensive accounts of the two traditions, neither to give a short-hand definitions, because no short hand definitions would be able to encompass and explain the synthesis between these two “strands of thinking”, paradigms if you like, which I would propose, as the key to this synthesis lies to a certain extent exactly in this richness and diverseness.
Liberalism has become the meta-ideology of our age (certainly the 21st century, especially if we discount some minor differences – the question if we can legitimately do so remains). Concepts such as “freedom”, “rational choice”, “rights” (and more controversially, “human rights”) are used all the time, predominantly legitimized as regimes of truth, to take Foucault’s term. Liberalism as such recognizes “the right of everybody to be right”, and is based on a recognition that “you are unique, but so is everyone else”, placing the individual as a value by him/herself in the center of its moral conception of the world (1). All these elements and many others (you can thank J.S. Mill, but also James Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Isaiah Berlin, Ayn Rand…) are in what we nicely label “liberalism”. In a sense, the Internet as a socio-cultural phenomenon is the ultimate culmination of liberalism – you can (or at least in principle) have a say in anything (consider the explosion in number of blogs, a form of ultimate freedom from any kinds of constraints – from audience and style up to coherence and logical progression), but so can everyone else. All says are equally legitimate,
although apparently there are power/knowledge (to borrow from Foucault again) relationships in place. This, however, comes into a clash with the central value of liberalism – the individual. If the individual is a value in him/herself, then there is an implicit assumption that the individual is always right for him/herself. Naturally, humans tend to forget the last part (why exactly naturally, I plan to deal later in another post, but in a nutshell simply because people are social creatures, who communicate with other within certain hierarchies of power, and, to borrow from realist IR theory, or Hobbes, they compete for power). Thus, the internet can be taken as a perfect illustration of some of liberalism’s internal tensions. Or, on the other hand, consider the idea of luxury goods – you don’t need them, therefore they are not rational choice (2), but you still want them, not for their superior quality (consider Naomi Klein’s brands in “No Logo”), but rather because they confirm, justify, and for some (not mentioning Nicolas Sarkozy) legitimize their perceived “exceptional status” and thus reinforce it even further. Perhaps a more concrete example, such as the thin line between “freedom of speech” and “incitement of hatred”, demonstrated vividly by the recent BBC controversy over allowing BNP’s Nick Griffin on its “Question Time”, would provide an even better way to understand the argument. The essential characteristics of liberalism outlined above (and those not outlined as well), as well as the tensions mentioned so far, are key for understanding post-modernism.
My label of “Marxism”, however, requires more detailed explanation. Here, I do not refer to Marxism as the thought of Karl Marx (and certainly not in terms of what came to be known as “communism”). In a sense, I apply this term slightly eclectically, referring to a number of sources, from Rousseau, Bakunin, Proudhon, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Lukacs, Marcuse, Adorno, Habermas, Horkheimer, to name a few. I would like to focus mainly on its “idealist” strand (that is, dealing with the power of ideas), and thus I would primarily draw on Gramsci and Barthes (who is not strictly speaking a Marxist – which only reinforces my “loose” usage of the term “Marxism”), although Marxist ideas about the power of ideas are implicitly or explicitly an essential part of the arguments of every Marxist thinker. For the purpose of this post, this particular element of Marxism with which I am concerned is neatly summarized by the following quote by Marx: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”. However, here I am not particularly interested the consequences of this for the structures of power and the status quo. What is of concern is how the Marxist tradition constantly highlights ideological structures, often associating them with power. Indeed, this has shown that “theory is always for somebody and for some purpose” (to quote Robert Cox), which was later developed by the power/knowledge relationship, to which Foucault has pointed.
How do these two “isms” fused together to produce a “postmodern condition”? In a nutshell, the liberal right of everybody to be right, coupled with the Marxist notion of ideational power undermined, and ultimately destroyed, any certainty people used to have before. Liberalism by itself, although filled with internal tensions, is a fairly coherent narrative, which could be sustained. Above I have noted that an amount of uncertainty and relativism is indeed part of liberalism (how can you be right and respect the fact that everyone else can be right? If you are a unique individual, how can everybody else be unique as well?), but these tensions are overcome by an appeal to individual abilities and merits (taken to the extreme in Ayn Rand’s “Atlas Shrugged”) (3). Marxism, however, deeply reinforced this tendency towards relativity by 
pointing out that ideas serve and promote interests, and thus taking away the psychological “feeling of being right” to which the individual was entitled under liberalism. Indeed, there are no more “right” ideas, “right” way forward, but instead everybody is allowed to (arguably) freely construct his/her ideas and identity (4). Thus, the individual was deprived of his ideational sources of certainty, and, I believe, for the first time in recorded human history every single person was faced with the question of moral relativity – indeed, there has been something of a paradigm shift. Of course, everybody is perfectly entitled to draw on religion, political convictions, football clubs, or whatever he/she might like to construct identity, image of himself, and certainty, but what Marxist ideational thought has done is to demonstrate that no identity is “innocent”, which has fused with liberalism’s belief that everybody is free (in theory) to construct his own identity to produce the realization that no identity is by itself “right”, and complicating all psychological “sleights of hand”, which pure liberalism allowed for. Thus, the end result is Lyotard’s “incredulity towards metanarratives” and Bauman’s “liquid modernity”, where there is no longer a fixed source of certainty and identity (and authority, since liberalism rejects all forms of all-imposing authority, a strand, which has been again reinforced by Marxist ideas), such as the tribe, the Church, the nation, or even the family. Thus, in a sense, post-modernism can be regarded as a “late” form of liberalism, or dialectic between liberalism and Marxism (to borrow from Hegel) (5). So all that leaves us with, really, is to adhere to the Latin proverb – “de omnibus dubitandum”.
(1) Have you ever noticed the close resemblance between “individual” and “indivisible”? It is certainly interesting to relate this to what we know as the metanarrative of Ancient Greece – that of the “atom”, of which everything is build.
(2) Not within the paradigm of liberalism – Marxism and others can present them as rational choice as signifying status and class, therefore keeping in place status quo hierarchies and people in subordination. Consider Rousseau’s argument that private possessions came as a way to differentiate yourself in bigger society, which then in a sequence of events led to the fallacious social contract in his “Discourse on Inequality”.
(3) I suppose one can argue that communism, or the policy prescriptive wing of Marxism, failed because it didn’t manage to strike such a fine balance between equality as a value-in-itself and individual egoistic tendencies as liberalism.
(4) This led to a rethinking of the liberal conception of the state, which now is (arguably) most often viewed as an arena where different groups/individuals fight for their interests, an impartial arbiter. Dunleavy and O’Leary have presented a very good summary of the main views of the state in their “Theories of the State”.
(5) The sociological repercussions of “living in the age of uncertainty” have been very well demonstrated and summarized by Zygmunt Bauman in his “Liquid Times”. In a further post, I plan to deal with some more philosophical/epistemological consequences of this, and to see how all this feeds in the framework of politics.
In this rather shorter post I would like to offer some critical reflections on Thomas Hobbes, and his “Leviathan” (1651) in particular. Of course, I do not claim to be comprehensive in my arguments, and I recognize that they might indeed be open to critique themselves. Nonetheless, I would like to engage with several of Hobbes’ key proposition. Those, acquainted with the work, can safely skip the next two paragraphs.
For those, unacquainted with the work, “Leviathan” is an extensive piece of writing of political philosophy, heavily influenced by the Scientific Revolution (especially in its attempts to provide a “theory” following a scientific method, which resembles slightly International Relations’ “Second Greate Debate” from the 1950s between positivists and behavioralists ), individualism, but mostly the English Civil War and the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. It introduces key ideas, such as that of a social contract, state of nature, and others, which are still fundamental to political theory today. In short, it argues that in the absence of all authority, a.k.a. state of nature, men is in a perpetual situation of conflict, “where every man is Enemy to every man”, and consequently “the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”. Therefore, the only way to escape this fate is for each to accept individually the rationality of giving away our Right of Nature (basically, the Right to do everything without any constraints) to the “artificial person of the state”, embodied by an absolute Sovereign, whose powers are without limits.
First of all, I must admit the powerful Cartesian logic, driving the whole argument (revealingly, Hobbes had significant correspondence with his contemporary, Rene Descartes). It may well be that it is a simple, at first glance even straightforward claim, but the way it is structured is fascinating even today. Hobbes’ first Book is called “Of Men” and revealingly deals with human nature, using Appetites and Aversions to build up his argument of human nature. After having established that, he then examines human behavior in a hypothetical situation – a state of nature, where there is no overriding authority, no Leviathan (a.k.a. no state), and shows it to be uncooperative, non-trusting, aggressive. It is important to note that he does not see this as a result of the wickedness of human beings, but simply a logical consequence from their rational individualistic behavior in this state of nature. Hobbes then argues that human beings rationally understand the need for a social contract, the need to give up their rights for the creation of some kind of authority – a state, embodied by a Sovereign (one or a multitude of people). According to him, the state of nature is a worst-case scenario, so everything is better. Therefore, to secure the power of this artificial authority, he argues, we need an absolute sovereign with extensive, monolithic powers, which is not subject to popular control, and has some other attributes. Thus, he logically conclude, absolute monarchy is the best form of government to prevent us from sliding into a state of nature and perpetual war.
However logical this account is, I have some problems with it. First, its assumption that people behave rationally may not be accurate, but that is a highly debatable subject. My main objections, though, are the following:
1. The physiological/psychological thesis of human nature, offered by Hobbes does not allow for free choice and free will, because people are just machines.
- Appetites and Aversions presuppose the acceptance of the object as a reference point
- It does not allow for change in people’s perceptions, people’s thinking
2. How does Hobbes account for the rationality of human beings?
3. If individual people recognise that it is rational to have one single sovereign, why do we have different states?
4. The basic premise is that of a competition for limited resources, a scarcity of resources, which arguably we are no longer facing.
5. The claim that equality between human beings leads to conflict is no longer accurate.
6. Related to the previous objections, it uses a concept of power, which is no longer relevant today.
I would still like, however, to look into the idea that people are behaving rationally. Of course, here I am developing a critique, which itself depends on many unwritten assumptions, one of which is the human ability of rational and logical thought. In terms of behaviour, however, people are not always behaving rationally. This is due, to a certain extent, to the simple fact that we take into considerations many factors at once, and it is hard to determine what is the most rational way of behavior, if there is such, and even if we were able to do this, it may not lead to our desired outcome (consider, for example, someone who wants to make an impression on some people by performing a stunt – he runs the risk of getting injured, which is hardly rational). In particular, however, I would like to challenge Hobbes’ key assumption – that by using Reason, humans come to the conclusion that it is more rational to give up their Natural Right of Liberty and come together in a absolutist Commonwealth. There is a whole separate branch of psychology, dealing with behaviour of large masses of people, which is quite interesting by itself, but could hardly be called rational all the time. Nonetheless, following Hobbes’ methods, I would like to consider the following event as a manifestation of a particular “state of Nature” – traffic jams.
If you think about it, traffic jams as a closed system could well be considered a “state of Nature”. It is true, that unlike Hobbes’ vision of a state of Nature, traffic does involve some general restrictions and rules, designed to protect our own physical safety – road signs, traffic lights, etc., and there is even an overall Leviathan-like authority – police. However, all these are not of much significance in a traffic jam. Here, the worst outcome would then not be violent that, and “the life of man” is obviously not “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. For the purposes of the argument we can then say that the worst-case scenario is significant delay in the amount of time it takes to reach your destination, possibly leading to other problems. The Right of Nature in traffic jams is that everybody is permitted to take every road he/she wants and to drive his/her own car. There, though, exist other options – to walk, to cycle, or to use the public transport system (to cooperate). Individually, the best option is, of course, to have the road for yourself – just you, your car, and a free highway. Thus, you will get in the fastest possible way to wherever you want to go. For those of you, who have used the Bulgarian public transport, the worst option would be to be stuck in a traffic jam and to not even be in your own proper car. There is quite a range of intermediate options – a couple of people driving with the same car, the aforementioned walking and cycling, actually comfortable buses, but the general point is that the best case scenario requires the exercise of your Natural Right and the non-exercise of the others’ Natural Right, but as the Right of Nature could not be morally and justly restricted without a Commonwealth, nothing can prevent everyone from using their Right of Nature – to drive alone in their car. This, naturally, leads to traffic jams (even when some people willingly “lay down” their Right by taking public transport or walking/cycling). I would like to just note that this game theory approach to traffic jams could of course be inherently wrong, if we reject the postulates of Cartesian logic. Here, however, according to Hobbes, we should all realise that it would be more secure (in terms of a set amount of time, more or less, which would take to get to a certain place, rather than risk being seriously late) to renounce the use of our cars (additionally, this would be beneficial for the environment, but that’s a whole different line of reasoning), and to all just take the public transport. This would also require that we give the police the right to arrest everyone who is driving a car, as to prevent the breaking up of this “social contract” (when somebody starts to drive his car, he is starting to exercise his Right of Nature again, and therefore it would then be moral and just for everyone else to also exercise their Right, i.e. to get their cars). Nonetheless, this does not happen – people still drive their cars, even though Reason can demonstrate the advantages of laying down the Right of Nature. Notice that this would not be in the name of the common good, or in the name of saving the planet, but simply in the rational self-interest of every participant in the traffic. This could demonstrate two main things. First, humans may be actually not that susceptible to rational argument when acting in large groups, and Hobbes’ theory deals with fundamental questions, involving a significant number of people. Consequently, some non-rational considerations may be more important than the pure rational analysis of humans, which Hobbes offers. Second, this raises the question whether it is really rational to agree to drastic limitations in your personal freedoms in order to guarantee better security for everyone. This is, admittedly, classical 21st C reasoning, based on “freedom” as a virtue in itself. The values and preoccupation of Hobbes, and probably of his contemporaries, were mostly that of peace and security, but this would then lead to the conclusion that Hobbesian absolutist thought is no longer of any relevance in the kind of society we live in. In any case, the big question mark of whether people prefer freedom or security remains (although the events of 1989, and much of Western European thought, arguably suggest an answer, which is dominant in a number of areas, notably in the concept of “human rights”). Nonetheless, it may also be that I am making generalizations from a particular case, but for Hobbes to claim that he has uncovered scientific “laws” about human behaviour (it may well be that this in itself is an impossible task as each human being is unique – another classical liberal and 21st C notion), he needs to account for all cases.
To carry on from here, I will point to some particular logical arguments, which are not fully convincing, but most importantly I would argue that Hobbes’ account holds no particular value for the contemporary world, but is rather simply an interesting intellectual exercise for academic purposes. Admittedly, Hobbes’ argument is remarkably cohesive, logical, and thorough, otherwise it would have long found itself in the “dustbin of history”, and he was really a remarkable thinker for his own time, who gave impetus to a number of other key authors to develop their own ideas, which we can now see in the world around us (notably Locke and Rousseau, and liberalism as a whole, arguably today’s meta-narrative in the Western world). However, from today’s perspective, we can relatively easily discard Hobbes’ account for the simple reason that “Leviathan” is unable to explain the process of change, the result of which we see today, and is therefore inapplicable in the contemporary situation. Nevertheless, I want to reiterate the importance of four centuries of hindsight that we enjoy today.
Coming back to my first criticism, the mechanistic view of human nature, presented by Hobbes, does not allow for independent judgment and thus for what’s generally called free will. Here, Hobbes is quite obviously influenced by the Scientific Revolution of his time. He tries to bring down the individual down to a cluster of atoms with Appetites and Aversions, which provoke motion. First of all, where do Appetites and Aversions come from, if human beings are just “motion of limbs” and automata? This implies that there is some innate knowledge inside our “atoms”, which provokes them to behave in the way they do. Hobbes would probably argue that this is the instinct for self-preservation, and he will be right – we are probably not going to “move towards” a fire and risk serious injuries (what about firefighters – what motivates them, which is higher than the highest Hobbesian law, that of self-preservation? A probable answer would be that they are part of a society, and have given their Right of Nature, so they are forced by the authority of the Leviathan to carry out this job. This could indeed be seen as a final confirmation of the fact that we have renounced our rights completely – but if so, does this mean that suicides are justified? More importantly, however, what would motivate someone to enter a burning house to rescue a child? Is the “appetite” towards the child stronger than the “aversion” against fire? Hobbes would argue that the “endeavour” which won was to save the child. This, however, leaves the question, why would we save a child? This question remains valid even after the establishment of the social covenant, as it is highly unlikely that any authority would explicitly demand that). Nonetheless, what would motivate our actions when they are not particularly related to self-preservation – such as “appetites” for cars and clothes, and generally objects with only social significance? In a very roundabout way, one can argue that one has a self-preservation interest to increase power, and therefore the signs of it (i.e. Rolex, Mercedes, etc.), in order to be able to better defend himself against aggression. This raises yet another problem – if this is so, therefore we are using the creations of the social contract in a way, suitable to the State of Nature – so what is the point of the Social Contract if relations between people, excluding the Sovereign, remain as those between wolves (whether wolves live in a perfect state of nature is quite an interesting question, which I regret that I don’t have the opportunity to pursue here)? To come back to the original point, and to simultaneously go to my second criticism, Appetites and Aversions presuppose certain knowledge about what is good and what is bad, as well as a knowledge of the objects to which they pertain. How is it obtained in a State of Nature? The general answer we would give today is through socialization, but no such thing exists in the State of Nature. This relates to yet another of my criticisms – by taking people as they are, Hobbes has arrived at a conception of human beings, which is static and unchanging. He looks at them at one particular moment, without considering their development. Thus, he does not allow for change in ideas. For him, rationality is driving human beings forward, but rationality changes – what was rational in the 17th C isn’t necessarily rational now. Besides, when dealing with social relations, one has to take into account that, to reformulate Wendt, “social relations are what people make of them”, i.e. when dealing with other people one presupposes their possible reactions (whether this is a involuntary form of manipulation is quite an interesting question as well). To wrap up, Hobbes takes human beings as a sum of their parts and nothing more, which eliminates free will and does not account for either change or primary accumulation of knowledge (furthermore, paternal ties in a State of Nature have no meaning, because there isn’t any morality).
As already mentioned, Hobbes’ argument is driven by a belief in human rationality. The question of whether human are rational was discussed earlier (although one can argue that game theory aims to explain exactly how individual rational behavior turns into collective irrational behavior, although this still leaves the question of how then a high number of people would come together to form a social covenant). If we accept for the purpose of the argument that they are, then that leaves us with the question of where does rationality come from. Self-preservation is the obvious source, with all the associated “Vitall” functions. Is rationality only about self-preservation? And how does it arise out of simple movements “to” and “from” objects? Most importantly, how do people resolve dilemmas, where there is a lose-lose situation involved? What happens if a impetus for something is equally strong as impetus against something? This question could, of course, be dismissed just as a highly hypothetical suggestion. The concept of rationality also brings about another question – if security is indeed the preoccupation of all people, why are there different states? Surely, the most rational thing would be to come under one single Sovereign Leviathan, instead of having a number of states. To this, I can see two possible answers. First, some would argue that we are actually moving towards exactly such a form of world government (although even if we are, it is quite different from the Hobbesian Leviathan). Second, perhaps more convincingly, people would argue that it’s a matter of practical arrangement – one sovereign can only control so many people. This provokes further problems – why then the international system itself is not structured by several layers of Leviathans (however absurd it may sound to have several layers of absolute authorities)? Second, what would then cause war – if people have found equilibrium of practical absolute authorities, why would they seek to take over another state? I’ll now leave the discussion of the implications of Hobbesian theory for International Relations, as it is quite a broad subject.
Now, let me reiterate my three criticisms on why Hobbes, even if accurate in the 17th C, is no longer accurate today:
4. The basic premise is that of a competition for limited resources, a scarcity of resources, which arguably we are no longer facing.
5. The claim that equality between human beings leads to conflict is no longer accurate.
6. Related to the previous objections, it uses a concept of power, which is no longer relevant today.
I recognize, however, that my premises are highly controversial. Is there enough resources for everybody? Is raw physical power inaccurate today? For that reason, I will discuss this only briefly. First, conflict in the State of Nature arises when two people desire something, of which there is only one copy. If two people desire each one apple, and there are two apples, there’s no conflict – the conflict arises when there is only one apple. Arguably, in the world today there are enough apples, i.e. food, the basic requirement for self-preservation, as to feed adequately all. If this is true, and everyone has equal access to it, then I do not see a reason why there would be conflict in a State of Nature. Second, equality is generally not regarded as a source of conflict, but as a requirement for peace. That is due to a general change of perception, a somewhat Lockean recognition of each other’s right to be equal (which may of course be only a consequence of the social covenant). Third, the concept of power, used by Hobbes – raw, physical power, is not adequate today simply because there are other sources of power, as, for example, ‘soft power’, ideational power, etc (I will not discuss the idea of power any further, because it necessitates much more time and effort and is worthy of a separate discussion. Also, Hobbes also recognizes other types of powers, but considers raw physical power to be predominant in a State of Nature, which makes his claim particularly hard to argue against).
In conclusion, I would like to mention that throughout this post I have encountered numerous times the problem of separating a state of nature from society. The State of Nature is an abstract, hypothetical, philosophical construction of immense complexity, although its essence is quite simple (as with most important ideas). Even if this post suggests that I am not particularly fond of Hobbes, and, more importantly, that I don’t believe that he has anything of particular importance to offer to us today, I would still like to point out once more that we have the advantage of a three centuries of hindsight. Nonetheless, the sheer logical structure of his account is worthy of respect. I recognize that I have mixed empirical and theoretical criticism of Hobbes in quite a few places, but due to time constraints, I cannot go further in my critique for now. We must also not forget that he was the first to articulate such complex ideas, which were later taken up by Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and quite a lot of other key figures. Thus, the true value of Hobbes is in the foundations he set for all other political philosophers to build on, in which we can compare him in importance only to Socrates.
“Who is John Galt?”
This has become something like a cultural meme in some parts in the world, mainly the US (interestingly, there has been an actual John Galt, a 19th C Scottish novelist, but I don’t think it has anything to do with the fictional character). We have Ayn Rand to thank (or curse) for that. I must admit I was not really acquainted with her until I heard that her book sales in the USA are second only to the Bible. Naturally, this prompted me to do some more research to understand this phenomenon. Funnily, it turned out that the two authors, who got a massive boost to their sales during the recession, are Marx and Rand. Additionally, our Bulgarian president recently bought two of her books under the spotlight of a couple of cameras. I’ve seen her books getting more and more visible in pretty much all major bookshops in 
Sofia. So she’s popular. I decided to check out for myself, so I got her magnum opus, “Atlas Shrugged” (1957). Initially, I was impressed by the sheer size of the book – more than 1100 pages, and what’s more, in Times New Roman 10 print (and the edition was described as “pocket size”, despite hardly fitting in my bag). Finally, I got enough free time (that is, around two weeks and a half) to read it in full. The first 300 pages were all right, but from then on, it got progressively harder to keep on reading, although my stubbornness helped me out. To be fair, it provoked me to write this post, so I suppose it impressed me enough. So, get ready for my critique of Ayn Rand’s “Atlas Shrugged”, of which I generally think as the biggest waste of my time in the last years (even more than Football Manager).
It is polite to start with praise, and I do have some for Ayn Rand’s work. It’s perhaps a good moment to point out that “Atlas Shrugged” is the only book by her, that I have read in full. Still, from what I’ve seen as reviews, opinions, and views, it is considered to be her most eloquent and well-written work, stating clearly all her main ideas. Therefore, I will not shy away from generalizations, like I usually do.
I already mentioned that the first 300 pages were not bad. In fact, they did get me hooked on, and I read them with a lot of pleasure. Besides, she probably has one of the most well-known first-lines in the world (in the US in any case). However, I did feel as if the story has ended and no further development would naturally flow out from the construction of the John Galt Line, so perhaps that is why since that I struggled to maintain my interest in a book, which was becoming more and more predictable and repetitive (although I got the same feeling with Alain Robbe-Grillet’s “Les Gommes”, so it may just be that I don’t trust big books in general). In terms of ideas, surprisingly, there are a couple of them with which I do agree. It may be that I am a hopeless romantic, but I found her view on love to be quite interesting, “If you tell a beautiful woman that she is beautiful, what have you given her? It’s no more than a fact and it has cost you nothing. But if you tell an ugly woman that she is beautiful, you offer her the great homage of corrupting the concept of beauty. To love a woman for her virtues is meaningless”. Indeed, it’s repeated a couple of times that love has to be earned, a little bit like any business success, by ‘trading’ your virtues for the virtues of the other. I wouldn’t particularly subscribe to this point of view, but it certainly raises some thoughts about what exactly we consider the nature of (this mystic word) love to be.
Another pretty good insight is the idea of the importance of sanction from the victims. I don’t know if that’s what she intended, but it reminded me of the concept of legitimacy. Indeed, in the book the characters are often forced by others to accept their wishes, or rather orders, with no alternative left. Nevertheless, they expect the ‘victims’ to give a ‘sanction’ to the orders, so it appears like a partnership or even as a voluntary action, and they detest the use of direct force. Whenever this sanction is refused by the morally superior characters, the ‘authorities’ feel nervous, because directly ordering someone to do something blasts away the look of voluntary partnership. Again, this can be perhaps seen in international relations between big super- or hyperpowers and ‘smaller’ states, when the strong ones ‘reason’ with the weaker ones and ‘convince’ them that whatever is in the interest of the strong is in the interest of the world (Free trade? American military bases? Foreign companies drilling oil? You name it…).
However, that’s pretty much everything I can praise in this work of art. The only emotion I felt towards the end of the book was that although I agree with almost nothing of what the author writes, it helps us see how some people think (if we are to use generalizations, then this would be “how some Americans think”). From this point of the view the book is extremely useful – how often does a book allow you to understand other people better? So, here I would agree with Voltaire “I hate what you are saying, but I will defend to death your right to say it” (despite the questions on the authenticity of this quote).
Now, what don’t I like in “Atlas Shrugged”? Since I need to start from somewhere, I will begin with the simple and plainly boring artistic style. I was ready for some philosophy, but the beginning got me in the mood of reading a work of literature rather than lengthy philosophical disputes. Besides, so much of her argument depends implicitly on artistic devices (discussed later) that it would be impossible to read this fully emotionally detached from the plot and the characters. Since I mentioned the characters, I will start with them. Dagny Taggart, Hank Rearden, John Galt, Mr. Thompson, Dr. Sandler, Wesley Mouch, etc. – the 1100-page book naturally has a whole constellation of characters, often introduced somewhat randomly. The problem with ALL of them is that they are simple, one-sided characters, who easily fit in two categories – “good” and “bad”. The “good” ones are always right, they almost never ever doubt their judgment, and they have an occasional breakdown just to return stronger and more convinced in their righteousness. They (of course) fight an equal and worthy of respect battle with the forces of “evil”, whatever they are (usually – the government in general, in its role as a Leviathan). The “bad” characters are equally one-sided – if you are “bad”, you cannot do anything worthy of respect. If you start in one of the camps, then you can never switch camps. The “good” ones never ever allowed them to be corrupted even slightly, while the “bad” ones most often feel remorse (surprise, surprise), but are generally incapable of a spiritual transformation. Some do try, but all are killed in the end, suggesting that if you are corrupted, then there is no way to ‘purge’ yourself (Dr. Sandler, James Taggart’s wife, the Wet Nurse). Of course, in the end, the forces of “good” and “evil” engage in the final battle, where with much force of will and courage the “good” ones triumph, and all “evil” ones are killed. Ta-dam. Surprised?
Second, the arguments Ayn Rand advances are simple, clear, and straightforward. Just as the characters, there are no doubts, no complex situations, no dilemmas – if you follow these premises, you are virtuous. No conflict is possible outside the conflict between the “good” ones (those, who share her ideas about commerce, human nature, and role of government) and the “evil” ones (those, who simply don’t). No one EVER questions these premises. Sure, the 
protagonists wonder whether to escape the world or to keep on fighting a fight (which is increasingly portrayed as impossible), while in the end abdicating, because of their strong moral codes. Additionally, Rand uses artistic devices to further the division between good and bad, so that we are not fooled and do not get confused. The “good” ones are always beautiful, strong-willed, have authority and an invisible force over the others, are revered and feared by the “bad” guys. They always struggle and always win (who said Hollywood?). To further her quasi-philosophical arguments and ideas (also discussed later), she portrays characters as sharply distinct – those, who share her ideas, are capable, interesting, virtuous; those, who don’t, are weak, provoke pity, and are portrayed as not having anything worthy in them. The “good” ones are always certain in what they do, they understand themselves with only smiles, or looks, or eyes, or whatever, they don’t even need words, but they are never torn by arguments “for” and “against” (except when they have to decide whether to fight for a dying world or to just give up, the second gradually emerging as the better, more virtuous, morally superior alternative). All this amounts to one word – boring. I’ve already mentioned that the first 300 or so pages are not that bad, but after that the reader has already understood Rand’s ideas and points, but she goes on and on and on to explain them more and more and more explicitly, and the result is a dull, repetitive plot, which culminates in a 70-page (!!!) monologue of one of the main characters. I will let you draw your own conclusions if the climax of a book is a 70-page dull monologue…In addition to this, throughout the whole book I was completely confused as to when the story unfolds exactly. The importance of trains and train transportation, the lack of organized air transport suggests something like the beginning of the 20th C. However, inventions such as Galt’s motor, and the calendar, hanging in the sky, in addition with the Project X weaponry suggest a somewhat more sci-fi setting. This feeling of temporal confusion generally goes on to become quite annoying and it adds to the sense of general boredom.
Last from the purely artistic critique, but definitely not least, the book has a more-than-distinctive American flavour. The setting, of course, is the US, with New York taken as the best, most worthy, and highest achievement of mankind. More striking is the fact that all the other states in the world are “People’s States”, who supposedly rely on “handouts” (that’s the word used a number of times in the book) from the US to survive. The USA (wow, another surprise) are the only “free” state in the world, but as the story unfolds, they become more and more like a “People’s States”, which epitomizes the worst, the most evil transformation, in itself a kind of apocalyptic eschatological event. There are no explicit mentions of race, but in the context of the book, it appears that all characters are young white men and some women. Nonetheless, there are some explicit pseudo-racist arguments in the book, where India and China are targeted as a particularly backwardish types of society and economy (but it is striking that the USSR is never mentioned explicitly).
P.S.: In the second part of my critique, I will consider the unique Cold War flavour of Ayn Rand’s book and I will (finally) tackle the more philosophical aspects of her work.
Интересно нещо е икономиката. Ето, например МВФ е направило технически ‘грешки’ в доклада си за април. Добре, че някои хора все пак си знаят данните и не са оставили случая – след намесата на Чехия и няколко други страни, са въведени ‘корекции’. И така, за какви грешки става въпрос?
Изчисленията външен дълг/резерви са важни индикатори за стабилност. Защо – лесно може да се разбере. Ако страна ‘А’ има много по-голям дълг от наличните пари, то тогава не е много добра идея да се инвестира в нея. С една дума – индикатор за нестабилност. Самите грешки – фрапиращи изчисления, показващи 236% съотношение за Чехия (в последствие намалено на 89%), 210% за Естония (намалено на 132%) и 188% за България (коригиран на 132%). Както се вижда, първите цифри са индикатор за доста по-голяма нестабилност, отколкото вторите. Прави впечатление, че прогнозите за Източна Европа са винаги все по-лоши и по-лоши – икономическият ръст на България за 2009 бе постепенно ревизиран от +1% до -3.5%. Но за това – ще поживеем, ще видим. Очевидно МВФ е публикувало извинение, което моите опити да намеря на техният уебсайт се оказаха безполезни.
Казват, че да се греши е човешко. И от МВФ така – “грешка в датабазата”, “неумишлено удвояване на външния дълг”. Ех, само на Източна Европа им се случва това. Не че нещо, но все пак МВФ се очаква да е институция, която се разпорежда с милиарди долари. Дори и да оставим настрани всичките дебати за политиката на МВФ през 90те години в пост-комунистическите страни и 1997 в Азия, остават доста въпросителни. Все пак, тази институция се следи от всички и притежава сериозен авторитет, дори и заемите й да са малко на принципа “знаем, че нямате, така че знаем, че няма да откажете” и по принцип страните бягат като от чума от нея. Нейните неолиберални критерии за отпускане на заем са в основата на не един и два финансови колапса с идеята да се установят инситуции, по-пригодени за свободните пазари. А от свободните пазари има асиметрични печалби в полза на един доста тесен кръг страни. Важното е, че в икономиката думите на някой участници предопределят поведението на други. Ясно е, че Източна Европа не е финансово най-стабилното място на света в тази финансова криза (а кое ли е?). Въпросът е, как следва да тълкуваме такива грешки на такива институции?
Силно препоръчвам статията на г-н Вулов по въпроса.
This will be a short post, because, really, Mogens Camre – Danish MEP from a right-leaning, conservative formation, does not need much comment. Today, 
he gave an interview to RFI. I would like to start with a quote.
“When I look at the voting rules, I see that countries like Romania and Bulgaria have many more votes than Denmark and Sweden and Finland, and I think – honestly speaking – that we are more clever than they are.”
Apparently, we are also “old-fashioned”, “anti-reformist”, and “reactionary”, and we have “so much influence in Europe”. Yes, Mr. Camre, no doubt the combined total of 50 MPs from Bulgaria and Romania is indeed hugely influential in the 785-member European Parliament – indeed, more than, say the 415 MEPs from the 6 biggest countries (in terms of population, as voting is based on proportional representation) – Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain and Poland. In terms of seats, Scandinavia (if we are going to group countries together) has a total of 44 seats – they can now legitimately blame Norway for failing to enter the EU. Rough calculations also reveal that the ratio of population-per-seat in the EP is roughly equal in Bulgaria, Denmark and Finland – around 410 000 voters, while it is roughly 650 000 per seat in Romania, and 828 000 per seat in the biggest EU country, Germany.
Moving away from math, he claimed that “Western and northern European countries have societies that are more transparent, democratic and healthy”. I would agree with the assessment of ‘more transparent’, although it is quite an ambiguous word. More democratic? Like, they are get 5 out of 6 points in the ‘democratic’ scale? No offense meant, but (if we are stereotyping about cleverness, why not stereotype about this as well) most computer hackers come from Scandinavia. The last Freedomhouse report declares Sweden, Denmark, Finland, as well as Bulgaria and Romania as being “free”. More healthy? Even if we leave the infamous cartoons aside, we are still faced with declarations, such as, “The Islamic political-religious movement deals with world supremacy, as did other fanatic political ideologies in history. This world supremacy they are not able to achieve by military means, but try to achieve by flooding the world with people. All western countries are infiltrated by the Muslims – and some of them speak to us nicely, while they wait to be many enough to have us removed – like in the Sudan, Indonesia, Nigeria and in the Balkans.” Talk about liberal tolerance. By the way, this is a quote from the same Camre guy.
I would like to get one thing straight – how does votes in EP determine the fate of the EU community? It votes the budget (minus agriculture, which is ‘only’ 45%) and it has the power to veto the appointment of the European Commission. Apart from that, it has some de facto legislative initiative, but is very restricted – as a branch of the legislature, these are all its powers. The dual executive is where real power resides – the European Commission and the European Council. There each country has only one member. In the European Commission, Denmark cannot complain of lack of power, as it holds the Agriculture portfolio, one of the key European portfolios, Sweden – International Relations, and Finland – Enlargement, while Bulgaria has Consumer Protection, and Romania – Multilingualism. If we are to analyze “power” of states, we can clearly see that population has pretty much only nominal meaning. This does not mean that the EP is irrelevant, but simply that it is not the source of power, although it performs important duties. The distinction is similar to that of an executive and legislature within a state – the government has all the power, but the parliament is also a key body in the separation of power.
Maths and institutions, however, are not the only thing, not even the most important thing in what Camre’s statement reveal. “Honestly speaking,” he says, “we are more clever than they are”. This is quite in contrast with all kinds of liberal values, which their “better” democracy should be promoting. Furthermore, it is revealing of how the EU thinks. Camre is in his last term in the EP and will not be running again, so this shows that he honestly believes what he says, he is not burdened by the consequences, and it is not simply a matter of political calculation for the upcoming elections. Elsewhere, I’ve dealt with how Western media sees Bulgaria, but this comment seems to be directly linked to what I’ve discussed in terms of the financial crisis’ impact on divisions within the EU. Economic and social rights restrictions and even “fear” of Eastern Europe has dominated the EU recently. Yes, the EU is becoming larger and larger. However, it managed to deal with numerous issues, related to expansion. After the first three expansions (UK, Ireland, Denmark in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal 1986), it grew from 6 to 12 countries, including some arguably “underdeveloped” countries, which have recently been under dictatorial rule. Now, they are successful members of the EU. It manage to deal with German reunification without collapsing. Apparently, it is managing the 2004 expansion quite well. Is the 2007 expansion the cause for all EU problems? So many do think so – corruption, instability, economic collapse (yes, Eastern Europe is the source of the financial crisis of Europe…or at least they feel like it). It’s always useful to have a scapegoat – and two scapegoats, which everybody thinks go together (Romania and Bulgaria) is better than the 10 countries, who joined in 2004.
In conclusion, I would like to repeat a point I’ve made countless times. First, yes, we do have many serious problems here in Bulgaria – corruption, crime, even some form of political deadlock. However, I am sure countries in Western Europe have some problems of their own – be it corruption, financial crisis, rise in xenophobia, separatism, terrorism, crisis in participation…but having a scapegoat is always a preferred choice of populist politicians. Recently, however, the number of divisions in the EU along “iron curtain” lines, or rather 25-2 lines, become more and more apparent. Second, it makes sense in terms of power politics of other nation-states (are there any nation-states in Western Europe?) to behave like this, but the EU is built on liberal principles, such as justice, toleration, mutual respect. Certainly, Eastern Europe, and Bulgaria and Romania in particular, are not always treated with respect. Apparently, because, “honestly”, we “are not clever”.
P.S.: You can leave your reaction here, on the official RFI page, where even Mr. Camre has “responded” to comments.
